Medieval and Renaissance Battle Formations

[Joseph French]

Reading the article on this website "Tactical Swordsmanship" sparked my curiosity to learn about more Medieval and Renaissance tactics. More specifically, it seems all modern historical fencing organizations teach single combat or (rarely) one versus multiple attackers. This is no doubt of great importance. Yet, having had personal experience in modern military tactics as well as being a student of Classical period military history, it struck me their seems to be little mention of specific unit formations for the Medieval and Renaissance periods thus far in my admittedly limited research. In period movies and in books, the concept of calvary charges or infantry charges clashing, sometimes under cover of arrow and artillery barrages can often be seen. However, the unit formations, if they existed to begin with, quickly degrade into individuals fighting individuals instead of units fighting units. I cannot accept this as the truth. Allow me to elaborate in my loquacious manner.

In the Classical period, one obvious example of unit formations would be the phalanx. As many know, the phalanx was essentially a wall of men armed with shield and spear several rows deep that would engage the enemy with spear thrusts as a moving wall by interlocking their shields. This was particularly effective because it enabled individual soldiers to multiply their effectiveness against an enemy by fighting as a unit. Moreover, is essentially defeated all calvary and chariot charges to the front because horses are unwilling to charge into a wall of sharp sticks. When utilizing the phalanx, individual infantrymen, in order to be effective on the battlefield, need not be masters of any given weapon, but rather merely capable of some overhand spear thrusts, some sword cuts and thrusts, and the use of a shield. Of greater import to the effectiveness of the phalanx than any individual's mastery of weapon techniques was their discipline and unit cohesion. The simplicity behind the phalanx was its genius. The ease to gain a basic level of proficiency in fighting in a phalanx allowed non-professional soldiers to fill the role of heavy infantry during wartime, though they may only drill with unit and weapons a few times a year. This may be an over-simplification of the phalanx and it should be noted the vast difference in abilities of professional soldiers and armies of the day with the part-time soldier that held a separate occupation during peacetime. However, the whole point of the phalanx or any tactic (as noted in "Tactical Swordsmanship) was to make both that part-time soldier and his full-time counterpart more effective on the battlefield regardless of individual skill-at-arms.

Addressing an earlier point I made, when a phalanx engaged with the enemy, they would not break formation and fight as individuals. It would be pointless to train in the phalanx to begin with if this were the case. Imagine, drilling day in and day out in a technique where, after you've marched to the battlefield from your home polis, you use this technique to assemble before the enemy, march towards them, and then abandon said technique to fight as individuals. Ridiculous I know. Leaders went to great lengths to ensure their men remained in that formation because it gave the individual a better chance of living and killing the enemy than fighting alone. Once an enemy broke before the phalanx, again, great efforts would be made to keep the soldiers in formation in the phalanx during the pursuit phase of the battle (a phase better carried out by calvary and chariots, and by archers and slingers, than by heavy infantry). The moments directly following the victory in a skirmish or battle are when the victorious troops are at the greatest threat of defeat because of potential counterattacks. Therefore, breaking formations even after the battle was won was severely discouraged (and likely punished).

Yet, we see time and again re-enactments and re-tellings of Medieval and Renaissance battles where unit formations would breakdown upon the initiation of combat and a large scale display of one v. one and one v. many would ensue. My purpose with the above description of the Classical phalanx is to illustrate we have all heard of at least some Classical-period unit formations, their purpose, the weapons and the men that made them effective. We have all likely seen some of the many formations that have come into existence since the advent of gunpowder. What I have not read, or read perhaps only in vague description, is Medieval and Renaissance period unit formations. The above summary of a phalanx is a more detailed unit formation discussion than any I have read of the Middle Ages and Renaissance.

Thus, the questions I pose are what were some of the standard unit formations used in battle throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance, why were those strategies effective for the period (versus what came before and after), and are their any modern scholars actively seeking to incorporate the practice of unit based warfare in their studies and research of Medieval and Renaissance martial arts? Additionally, are there any good literary sources on the above subject matter you would recommend?

[Jonathan Newhall]

I know that by the 1600s Swiss pike mercenaries adopted a formation very similar to that of the phalanx, just without the shields. It was still very effective even into the age of firearms for a while as long as group coherency was maintained.

Otherwise, I dunno.

[Stacy Clifford]

Well a famous book from the Byzantine era that was very influential is the Strategikon (I need to get a copy of this myself):

http://www.amazon.com/Maurices-Strategi ... 981&sr=1-1

In Victor Davis Hanson's book Carnage and Culture, he describes the Franks at Poitiers in 732 as forming a very disciplined phalanx against the Moors, and Cortes's conquistadors in Tenochtitlan in 1520 formed up with crossbowmen and harquebusiers in something like a checkerboard formation between rows of bristling pikes (to protect them while reloading as the next row moves up to fire). The Saxons at Hastings in 1066 lost in large part because the Normans fooled them into breaking the discipline of their shield wall. I'm not sure what all the documentation might be for the tactics of the age, but there's plenty of evidence that unit discipline was important throughout the time period.

[s_taillebois]

As M. Newhall noted the Pike square.

But there were also other traditions such as the English would often place longbowmen behind obstructions (usually sharpened wood) that they often carried to and placed on the pitch. (The pitch itself was usually very carefully chosen, both Agincourt and Crecy demonstrate that discipline. As much as possible the English did not simply go rushing in as a mob)
Usually the men at arms were placed to support the archers. In Henry's armies this was common as the archers were more numerous (being cheaper to obtain) and so heavier armored troops needed to be used carefully to support them. (Which no doubt irritated the armor plated aristocrats. But the English had major problems in providing riding stock in France, or bringing such across the channel. So often a chivalric charge was the least effective way to use these men). In some ways Henry's campaign is a precursor of modern tactics insofar as his army was reliant on the use of a mass of trained commoners.
And it was common for longbowmen to change rates of fire and change ranges on command en masse. So unit discipline for archers was often fairly tight. Often they themselves emphasized that discipline, they knew if they lost they would not be ransomed, being 'men of no value'.
One of the reasons Henry survived the Agincourt chevelche was because of that discipline and some careful thinking about logistics. For example the archers could loose some 40,000+ arrows in a saturation fire which could only last a few minutes, and that couldn't be done without substantial planning well prior to and during a campaign. Nor could these archers have survived long without a fair amount of wood being cut as obstructions to cavalry-which was planned well prior to a fight. And of course the support from the dismounted men at arms was only workable if they resisted the temptation to rush out for god and glory and leave their archers unsupported.

At Crecy, the French discipline broke down. And when the Genoese crossbowmen were pushed forward (without their pavises due to poor logistical trains) by the mass of French troops behind...they had no option but to retreat under the massive fire of the longbowmen. Upon their retreat they were then promptly slaughtered by their own soldiers on orders of the commander on the field. Without the crossbowmen the French cavalry was then in turn massacred by the English. Pretty good example of what happened to a medieval army which lost discipline.

So M. French looking at a few of these battle's it's not too hard to find the unit discipline you were speaking about.

And the fecthbuchs can be a little misleading. Many of these were printed in the beginning of the era when the new bourgeoisie first had access to such information and had gained substantial rights (via guilds and town charters, especially after the Black Death) to arm themselves. In that regard some of the fight manuals would be roughly equivalent to a self defense book today, they were not intended as military tactic manuals.

[Joseph French]

What great insight and information thus far. I had read of the pike wall utilized by units employing matchlock firearms. It seems to me, based on the information posted, this pike wall was a descendant of the older battlefield formations of infantry protecting their ranged weapons from cavalry and infantry assaults. Am I to understand that in these time periods the missile weapons were relied upon for producing the most casualties (not unlike their modern equivalents)?

I suppose it only makes sense with the range and power available with long bows and cross bows. In Classical period warfare, armies could not could not rely as heavily on missiles to do the majority of the killing as the powerful bows for the single archer had not yet been developed, and cavalry did not have stirrups by which to steady themselves thus negating the widespread use of mounted archers.

So it also appears by the posted information that a form of the shield walls of the Greeks and Romans continued on into the Medieval and Renaissance periods. What characterized the techniques of close combat within the shields walls of these time periods? Any further information on unit sizes among the infantry? That is, did they fight as smaller more mobile units like the Roman centuries or as a larger army like the Greek phalanx? From a historical standpoint, I can't help but cringe when I think of the English infantry charges seen in the film Braveheart (though I like the movie). But it does illustrate my questions of whether the usage of a solid line of men against another was more frequently employed than smaller mobile units engaging the enemy from the front as well as seeking to attack the flanks in order to envelop the enemy. Logic inclines me to think the latter, but are there any examples of either? These are obviously overly general questions to which no black and white answer can be given, but I'm seeking create a discussion of suitable breadth and depth so feel free to go specific and counter my aforementioned assertions on unit warfare.

Thank you for the great posts thus far, I look forward to reading and learning more.

[Jonathan Newhall]

Some more things I've remembered is that on the use of cavalry it's very important to save them (for the commander, that is) for the time in battle when they may be best applied.

As according to Napoleon later this application could come at any time in the battle (and often did), and certainly medieval commanders knew this. Generally the lower ranked folks jockeyed for position by prodding one another with arrows and javelins, and once a vulnerable position opened up in the line a key tactic would be to break it with the knights or other cavalry.

The concept of "line of battle" continued onwards into the mid-1800s or thereabouts with cavalry being used, less and less often, but always for the purpose of breaking holes in weak areas of the line. The battle was very often fought around the line, at least in the later eras, so the line infantry were an integral part of the battle (most especially in the 1600s with the advent of the Tercio formation and others), but often otherwise unimportant in the general movements and victory of the battle. Morale break was often the cause for victory, thus the use of knights with enormous war horses.

[s_taillebois]

http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/s ... ncourt.htm

French assessment of the numbers at Agincourt.

http://www.deremilitari.org/REVIEWS/review8.htm

Gives some of the small units recruited for Agincourt.

The usual number of archers assumed to be at Agincourt is about 5,000 and about 1000 men at arms. However the archers did involve as melee troops so that distinction is a bit ambiguous. Once the enemy closed the archers would often then be melee troops so out came the mauls, falchions, and etc. Usually the better armored men at arms led the charge and the commoners followed. But it could be confusing. For example the Welshman Dafydd (David) Gam who aided Henry when he was surrounded was probably an archer (although there is some dispute if he actually existed) And because of the conditions at Agincourt the archers as melee might have been more influential, being lighter kitted and not have the same problems in the mud.

Concerning mobility and the ability to shift fronts and etc...

Medieval battles were often fought on pitched fields wherein the combatants had a fair amount of time to dress lines, and etc. Ambushes did occur but these were often hit and runs on baggage trains and etc. The nature of full scale medieval armies wasn't suited to fast movement, and that could be further compromise by weather, lack of forage and etc.

This was additionally conditioned by the methods of transport of the time. For example Henry's 6000 some men, various carts and stolen stock, equipage and etc moved at a foots pace and so movements of these armies were relatively slow. They could be forced as Harold's troops had done from the march away from Stamford Bridge, but it was difficult to do. (And its possible that's one of the reasons Harold Godwinson lost at Hastings, his troops were too fatigued from the fast forced marches.)

Basically the mobility of these armies was not dictated by the cavalry (which had its own equipage) but more by such as the foot soldiers, siege engines and etc. Fast mobility was often limited to chevelches or such as the Viking operations with the longboats.

So such as rapid flanking and etc probably occurred somewhat differently than what would be expected.

[LafayetteCCurtis]

In period movies and in books, the concept of calvary charges or infantry charges clashing, sometimes under cover of arrow and artillery barrages can often be seen. However, the unit formations, if they existed to begin with, quickly degrade into individuals fighting individuals instead of units fighting units. I cannot accept this as the truth.

This is pretty much the right choice; if you've read John Keegan's The Face of Battle or Phil Sabin's book on Roman infantry combat, you'll see how research into modern crowd dynamics has shown that medieval battle-lines almost certainly engaged as distinct lines as long as their cohesion held.

Moreover, is essentially defeated all calvary and chariot charges to the front because horses are unwilling to charge into a wall of sharp sticks.

Definitely not all; if Livy is to be believed, there were some instances of cavalry overruning infantry formations frontally at a time when many infantry forces in Italy were still fundamentally built in the manner of Greek phalanxes, though for the most part this happened after both sides' infantry had engaged in hand-to-hand combat for some length of time. The Persian cavalry at Plataea also came close to overwhelming the foremost Greek phalanxes before the remaining Greeks came to their aid.

The hoplite phalanx seemed to have been best at overwhelming opposing infantry formations with a headlong charge at the fastest speed it could manage without breaking up; arguably, its primary weapon was the heavy bronze-faced shield rather than the spear. On the other hand, the later Macedonian pike phalanx relied more on a constant long-term push by the inexorable advance of a deep formation tipped with long pikes. Neither seemed to have faced cavalry much in frontal combat, not the least because the tactical doctrine in the Hellenic and Hellenistic world largely expected cavalry to operate on the wings as flank-guards and outflankers. Curiously, in the hands of a n audacious commander, the better-disciplined examples of Greek hoplite phalanxes seemed to have been quite eager to attack cavalry, as Agesilaus's (and perhaps Brasidas's) seemed to have done on several occasions.

What I have not read, or read perhaps only in vague description, is Medieval and Renaissance period unit formations. The above summary of a phalanx is a more detailed unit formation discussion than any I have read of the Middle Ages and Renaissance.

Probably because the Ancients were a bit more anxious to make detailed records of their military shenanigans in writing than their medieval successors before the 14th or 15th century or so? The difficulty with medieval accounts of tactical encounters is that they tended to concentrate on the individual prowess of chivalric heroes even in cases where (to modern eyes) it is obvious that victory was won through teamwork and coordination.

Thus, the questions I pose are what were some of the standard unit formations used in battle throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance, why were those strategies effective for the period (versus what came before and after),

I'd suggest you to get Ian Heath's books on medieval armies, as well as the standard reference works on medieval warfare by J.E. Verbruggen and Philippe Contamine. They contain many references to medieval unit organization systems and tactical formations--far more than I can discuss in a forum post. There are some accessible online resources, like a blog post originally written to acquaint fiction writers with medieval European cavalry tactics, but in general they can't beat the extensively footnoted and cross-referenced books because the latter actually tell you where to look if you want to check about whether the book's interpretation is warranted by the original text in the medieval source.

and are their any modern scholars actively seeking to incorporate the practice of unit based warfare in their studies and research of Medieval and Renaissance martial arts?

Look for the best reenactment groups out there. I'd very strongly recommend The Company of Saynte George for the late-medieval period and the School of the Renaissance Soldier for the mid-to-late 16th and early 17th centuries.

[LafayetteCCurtis]

Basically the mobility of these armies was not dictated by the cavalry (which had its own equipage) but more by such as the foot soldiers, siege engines and etc. Fast mobility was often limited to chevelches or such as the Viking operations with the longboats.

Actually it could be decided by the cavalry, especially in later periods where the amount of equipment required by a full man-at-arms was so great that it took a substantial retinue to carry and maintain it. So, paradoxically, in these cases having cavalry (or at least men-at-arms) could actually slow down the army because of the impedimenta they'd have to bring just to keep themselves, their horses, and their equipment ready for combat.

[LafayetteCCurtis]

What great insight and information thus far. I had read of the pike wall utilized by units employing matchlock firearms. It seems to me, based on the information posted, this pike wall was a descendant of the older battlefield formations of infantry protecting their ranged weapons from cavalry and infantry assaults. Am I to understand that in these time periods the missile weapons were relied upon for producing the most casualties (not unlike their modern equivalents)?

It depends on the period. In the early 16th century the pike seems to have been the primary weapon of the most important infantry formations, both for defending against cavalry and (especially) for steamrolling the enemy's infantry formation. The role of the Shot (i.e. the generic term in the Renaissance for firearm-armed infantry) was mostly to harass enemy formations and to protect the pikes against enemy skirmishers. Later on, as firearm drills grew more sophisticated and effective, the Shot gained a stronger role in combat until by the early 17th century their destructive power was seen as being on a parity with the Pike. By the late 1620s there were cases of cavalry charges (by the excellent Polish hussars no less) being repelled almost solely by the firepower of well-drilled Shot, while in the 1640s there were some combats where the terrain so impeded the proper operation of Pike and Horse that the fighting was essentially won by the Shot. It also appears that, the better trained and better disciplined an infantry unit was, the more effective its Shot became in terms of their proportional combat power relative to the rest of the formation--not the least because the Pike was usually the better-trained half of the infantry anyway and so the improvements tended to be both larger in magnitude and more visible in the case of the Shot.

I suppose it only makes sense with the range and power available with long bows and cross bows.

When it comes to medieval warfare, the equation becomes far less simple and neat since we're looking at whole centuries of technological and institutional development. Just to take some examples, the better "Frankish" armies in the Crusades normally had the infantry structured with the crossbowmen as the principal means of protecting the entire army against the harassment of Saracen and Turkish horse archers while the spearmen formed a bulwark to shield the crossbowmen against attempts by desperate (or clever) enemy cavalry to engage the crossbowmen in hand-to-hand combat. The mounted men-at-arms were held as a reserve to deliver the decisive charge against enemies pinned down and weakened by the crossbows' bolts.

On the other hand, the spear/pike formations of the Low Countries and the Lowland Scots didn't seem to have had particularly considerable missile components; in fact, at the Battle of Falkirk the Scottish archers were quickly swept away in the initial charges by the English cavalry, while at Courtrai/Kortrijk it is likely that the French men-at-arms were encouraged to launch their disastrous charge by the fact that their missile infantry were winning the fight against the Flemish skirmishers strung out in front of the Flemish spearmen/pikemen/whatever.

As for the English longbowmen, it should be noted that they were particularly effective not only because they were generally better archers than the norm (in terms of their ability to deliver massed, disciplined barrages from their powerful bows) but also because they were (at least initially) better armed and better armored than most archers in their period, which made them capable of joining hand-to-hand combat when necessary. It also helped that their early battles happened at a time when horse armor didn't seem to have been widespread; when they did face cavalry formations that had plenty of horse armor, they got into serious trouble (as in the case of the longbowmen who got ridden down by Lombard cavalry at the Battle of Verneuil). Another thing particularly worth noting about the longbowmen is the longstanding disagreement about what their "herse" formation actually looked like; the only thing people seem to agree about is that the longbowmen were situated on the flanks of the dismounted men-at-arms, but beyond that there's still a raging debate about whether they were deployed on the flanks of the army as a whole, on the flanks of each "battle," or any other proposed arrangement.

In Classical period warfare, armies could not could not rely as heavily on missiles to do the majority of the killing

Actually, they could when the enemy was unarmored or poorly armored.

as the powerful bows for the single archer had not yet been developed,

Not as powerful as medieval bows, certainly, but the bows available were apparently strong enough to deal with the protective means available at the time; see Plutarch's account of the Battle of Carrhae, where the Parthian horse-archers were able to pin the Roman legionaries' arms against their shields and their (admittedly unarmored) feet against the ground. We also shouldn't forget other weapons like javelins, slingstones, and (most of all) mechanical artillery.

and cavalry did not have stirrups by which to steady themselves thus negating the widespread use of mounted archers.

Well, stirrups do make mounted archery a lot easier to do--I can speak from personal experience that, if you're sufficiently skilled in Eastern thumb-draw archery, the only thing you need to learn horse archery with stirrups is to get on the horse's back and practice like mad without much need for further instruction--but they were clearly not mandatory, as Roman (or Byzantine, anyway) heavy horse archers proved to be quite effective against Vandal and Gothic lancers during the reconquest of Africa and Italy in Justinian's reign (6th century AD, so well before the usual timeframe attributed to the widespread adoption of the stirrup).

So it also appears by the posted information that a form of the shield walls of the Greeks and Romans continued on into the Medieval and Renaissance periods.

In a sense; there were probably strands of both continuity and reinvention. Not all regions preserved Roman institutions and military paradigms--and by the same token, not all regions lost them.

What characterized the techniques of close combat within the shields walls of these time periods?

That they differed from place to place and time to time?

Any further information on unit sizes among the infantry? That is, did they fight as smaller more mobile units like the Roman centuries or as a larger army like the Greek phalanx?

Just the same. They differed widely. In some cases--as in Anglo-Saxon England--we have tantalizing hints from an extensive terminology but practically no idea about what the individual terms meant. When it comes to cavalry, though, it seems pretty clear that at least in some cases there were small, flexible maneuver units.

[s_taillebois]

"Actually it could be decided by the cavalry, especially in later periods where the amount of equipment required by a full man-at-arms was so great that it took a substantial retinue to carry and maintain it."

Quite true, and for the horse borne aristocracy not to have their traditional allotment of practical and status equipment along was a considerable loss of face. At minimum a riding horse, war horse, barding and armor, and the equipage for 10-12 henches and servants probably took quite a bit to haul around. And for a leader to offend these men was a problem-so except in dire circumstances cutting loose of that equipage was unlikely. Even trying to order someone's hench to do something without first getting permission from their lord, was enough to have some pull their contingent off the line.

And even for a 'poor' knight all this would slow things down. In an old Spanish legend three knights shared a riding horse, but likely that still meant they had the war horses and a cart for hauling armor and the like.

People tend not to think of medieval armies as being affected by logistics but these certainly were, which in turn affected their movement. Which often kept the surrounding countryside in turmoil, campaign season was often planned to coincide with harvest or just after the harvest.

[Benjamin Parker]

In the Classical period, one obvious example of unit formations would be the phalanx. As many know, the phalanx was essentially a wall of men armed with shield and spear several rows deep that would engage the enemy with spear thrusts as a moving wall by interlocking their shields. This was particularly effective because it enabled individual soldiers to multiply their effectiveness against an enemy by fighting as a unit. Moreover, is essentially defeated all calvary and chariot charges to the front because horses are unwilling to charge into a wall of sharp sticks.

Chariots are not used for charging (egyptian ones anyway) because

A: The horses were tiny

B: The shock of a charge would damage the chariot to badly

A chariot was used to provide mobile missile support and in greece they were used to ferry officers around not fighting

And Keegan states that horses wont charge spear formation bacause they didn't at Waterloo so therefore horses of earlier times didn't either

And What about about Ceresole, Ravenna, Maragnio, Seminaria and Dreux where the gendarmes charged pike squares frontally and went right through (And the pikes wern't shaken before impact)
also take a look at Kilchusny where the Husaria charged through a fence and the pikemen multiple times and heres a list of
6 battles (Kircholm 1605, Kłuszyn 1610, Smoleńsk 1633, Mohylew 1655, Połonka 1660, Basia 1660), where hussars defeated pikemen.


There were another battles where hussars defeated pikemen (like Lubieszów 1577, Byczyna 1588, Mitawa 1622 etc.).

As for formations the gendarmes charged in an En Haye (Line) it was usually two ranks deep or one (although three ranks was common as well) the bring to bear the maximium amount of lances of the enemy


You can read about them in wikipedia too http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gendarme_(historical) (Not the best source I know but it was I could find)


In fact in Bohemia, one of the most common ways of knightly training was to charge a wall and break a heavy lance against it.

[Martin Lysen]

Having done a lot of group combat, I'd have to say that the swirling melee is the quickest way to get killed there is. If one does not stay together i group combat, one is usually toast.

As for larger unit interactions, I have no direct experience, but what kills you most often in small group combat is getting flanked. Enemies to the front can be dealt with for quite extended periods of time, if group cooperation is present - i.e. you protect your mates and they protect you.

The organization and interaction of sub-units were manifold in both ancient and medeival/renaissance armies. Generally, having a reserve to deal with flank attacks, breakthroughs or to seize the initiative is a universal tiebreaker no matter what era one looks at.

In my own group fighting, having as much as one third of your fighters (if there is like 5 to 10 people per team) has proven quite useful. Sometimes it takes just one fighter in reserve position to exploit an opportunity and turn a whole fight around.

[LafayetteCCurtis]

Chariots are not used for charging (egyptian ones anyway) because

A: The horses were tiny

B: The shock of a charge would damage the chariot to badly

A chariot was used to provide mobile missile support and in greece they were used to ferry officers around not fighting

Only true for Egyptians. Developments somewhere along the line--perhaps in the mid-13th century BC--led to the appearance of heavy charging chariots that either supplanted or supplemented the earlier archery-based chariot forces, and it is quite likely that these chariots were supposed to charge into contact--at least against enemies already weakened and disorganized by the arrows of the archers that still formed part of their crew complements. Later on, long after "proper" chariots had disappeared from most of the medieval world, several forces experimented with scythed chariots and these were very clearly supposed to smash into enemy formations; damage to the horses or chariots would not have mattered all that much since these scythed vehicles were meant to be suicide troops anyway, and in fact dead horses and/or broken chariots might actually have decreased the incidence of horses or drivers shying away from the enemy line. If you've seen videos of harness racing accidents, you'll see how a damaged chariot can easily be more damaging than an undamaged one that could still swerve away if either the horses or the crew chickened out!

And Keegan states that horses wont charge spear formation bacause they didn't at Waterloo so therefore horses of earlier times didn't either

And What about about Ceresole, Ravenna, Maragnio, Seminaria and Dreux where the gendarmes charged pike squares frontally and went right through (And the pikes wern't shaken before impact)
also take a look at Kilchusny where the Husaria charged through a fence and the pikemen multiple times and heres a list of
6 battles (Kircholm 1605, Kłuszyn 1610, Smoleńsk 1633, Mohylew 1655, Połonka 1660, Basia 1660), where hussars defeated pikemen.

Actually, not all of these were so clear-cut in terms of husars "defeating" pikemen. For example, at Klushino/Klusyn/whatever, the first ten unsupported charges by the husars failed to make an impression upon the entrenched Russo-Swedish infantry, and the Poles only managed to break through when the infantry and artillery arrived to launch a combined-arms attack along with the reformed husars. Similarly, at Kirchholm (IIRC) the success of the husars at one part of the line was due to the fact that they managed to throw the routed Swedish cavalry back upon their infantry--a brilliant move regardless of whether it was a deliberate action or an on-the spot improvisation. Elsewhere on the line the Swedes generally held out, and they were doomed not because husars could overrun pike-and-shot infantry at will (they couldn't) but rather because they were left exposed, vulnerable, and isolated once the husars had swept the Swedish cavalry off the field and overran the artillery.

The case of the French gendarmes is also a rather messy one. At Ceresole they didn't "charge pike squares frontally;" the best accounts we have of the battle speak of the cavalry slamming into the flanks, rear, or corners of the squares, and in practically all cases they took heavy casualties along the way (although they also inflicted heavy losses in return upon the pikemen). Ravenna was a really messed-up battle and it must be remembered that Gaston de Foix's pursuing detachment of cavalry was badly beaten and the commander himself killed in fighting against a retreating detachment of Spanish infantry at the end of the battle. Marignano is a good example of French cavalry charging into contact with Swiss pikemen but they certainly didn't break the Swiss--that was the doing of the French artillery. Dreux is one more badly messed-up battle and it's possible to interpret the charge of Huguenot gendarmes through the Swiss not as an attack against the pikemen but rather a sweep through the spaces between the pike blocks, which would have been filled by Swiss arquebusiers and skirmishers in a looser formation. Seminara? Well, it was hardly a battle at all since the Spanish/Neapolitans pretty much just ran away after some initial skirmishing--I seriously doubt there were any incidents where the French cavalry ran into any serious opposition by infantry, since by the time they got to the enemy infantry those enemies were already fleeing in disorder.

All that aside, we must also remember that both the Polish husaria and the French gendarmes were substantially better than their counterparts in other contemporary armies--and probably better, too, than the vast majority of shock cavalry units in human history. So they may not exactly be the best yardsticks for measuring the performance of other cavalry.

Of course it's also true that the pike's anti-cavalry aspect has generally been overemphasized in the modern popular idea of medieval warfare--medieval pikes were mostly meant for steamrolling enemy infantry, and defense against cavalry was a rather secondary (if still quite important) concern in their use.

As for formations the gendarmes charged in an En Haye (Line) it was usually two ranks deep or one (although three ranks was common as well) the bring to bear the maximium amount of lances of the enemy

Only the French, and even then we only know this for certain for the last century of the Middle Ages or so. In other places and periods the evidence was a bit mixed; the French at the Battle of Bouvines deployed wide and shallow due to fears of being outflanked by their numerically superior German opponents, but the Flemings at Worringen formed up somewhat deep and the Germans at Pillenreuth (both on the nobles' and the Nurembergers' side) deployed in very deep wedge-tipped columns.

[Benjamin Parker]

I never said they broke them, they didn't. My point was they charged home against them